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Does Less Market Entry Regulation 
Generate More Entrepreneurs?
Evidence from a Regulatory 
Reform in Peru
Sendhil Mullainathan and Philipp Schnabl
5.1    Introduction
Starting a new business in a developing country is diﬃcult. Aspiring entre-
preneurs often need to spend large amounts of time and money to formally 
open a new business. As a result, many entrepreneurs in developing countries 
avoid oﬃcial licensing procedures by operating informally or not operating 
at all. Starting with De Soto (1990), a large literature has pointed toward 
oﬃcial licensing procedures as an important constraint on entrepreneurial 
activity in developing countries. This constraint on entrepreneurial activity 
in turn stiﬂ  es innovation, reduces competition, and lowers economic growth. 
However, there is little empirical evidence on whether reductions in licensing 
procedures indeed generate more entrepreneurial activity.
To address this question, we analyze the impact of licensing procedures 
on entrepreneurial activity by studying a reform of municipal licensing pro-
cedures in Lima, Peru. The reform reduced the cost and time to register for 
a municipal business license. We study this speciﬁ  c reform for two reasons. 
First, by analyzing a change in licensing procedures, we can identify the 
impact of licensing procedures on entrepreneurial activity separately from 
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other factors aﬀecting entrepreneurial activity. Second, this type of licensing 
reform is similar to policies currently undertaken by many governments in 
developing countries, and the ﬁ  ndings are thus relevant elsewhere.
Our analysis shows that the reform of licensing procedures had a large 
positive impact. The reform reduced the median licensing time by 60 per-
cent, from forty to sixteen days, and lowered the average licensing cost by 42 
percent, from $212 to $124. As a result, the number of newly licensed ﬁ  rms 
increased fourfold, from 1,758 in the year before the reform to 8,517 in the 
year after the reform. This increase of newly licensed ﬁ  rms represents a 43 
percent increase in total licensed businesses.
To understand the reasons for this large increase in newly licensed ﬁ  rms, 
we conduct interviews with a random sample of 200 newly licensed ﬁ  rms 
before and after the reform. We distinguish between two types of businesses: 
businesses that have been operating informally prior to applying for a license 
and businesses that have not. We ﬁ  nd that about 75 percent of the increase is 
due to businesses that have operated informally before applying for a license, 
and 25 percent of the increase is due to newly established businesses. Since 
informal businesses can only switch once, we estimate that about 75 percent 
of the increase in newly licensed businesses is temporary and 25 percent is 
permanent.
To understand the motivation for obtaining a license, we interview newly 
licensed ﬁ  rms about their reasons for applying for a municipal license. Both 
before and after the reform, the most important reason for applying for a 
license is to avoid paying ﬁ  nes and bribes. Other reasons such as access to 
credit or the ability to enforce contracts are far less important. We explain 
this result by the fact that the municipal license is only one part of a lon-
ger process to formalize a business, and most beneﬁ  ts usually associated 
with formalization are linked to other parts of the licensing process. For 
example, our interviews suggest that access to credit is linked to obtaining 
a tax identiﬁ  cation number, which is a required step prior to applying for a 
municipal license.
Overall, we interpret our results as evidence that organizational reform 
can have a large impact in an environment in which bureaucrats lack the 
incentives to provide eﬃcient services. We think this lack of incentives is 
caused by the absence of an organized constituency for new businesses, since 
the beneﬁ  ts of better licensing procedures are highly dispersed. Instead, 
the licensing process provides opportunities for bureaucrats to extract rents 
from businesses, which in turn generates incentives to maintain a costly and 
time-  consuming licensing process. Over time, the lack of a constituency 
combined with opportunities for rent extraction leads to an environment in 
which even simple changes aimed at improving the licensing process are not 
implemented. Hence, in this type of environment, an organizational reform 
can have a large impact on the quality of public services.
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lation. The ﬁ  rst study of entry regulation was conducted by De Soto (1990), 
who documented the large cost of licensing a new business. More recently, 
Djankov et al. (2002) conducted a cross- country study of market entry regu-
lation in eighty-  ﬁ  ve countries. They ﬁ  nd that all countries regulate market 
entry, but high- income countries regulate market entry less than low- income 
countries. The authors ﬁ  nd no evidence of public beneﬁ  ts of regulation and 
conclude that market entry regulation is set up to extract rents from busi-
nesses. Klapper, Amit, and Guillén (chapter 4 in this volume) analyze the 
determinants of business registration using cross-  country panel data. They 
ﬁ  nd that countries with a higher level of economic development and better 
governance have higher registration rates. Their ﬁ  ndings suggest that more 
extensive market entry regulation can reduce entrepreneurial activity.
This chapter also relates to the literature on the characteristics of entre-
preneurs in developing countries. Mondragón- Vélez and Peña (chapter 3 in 
this volume) ﬁ  nd that business owners in Columbia have higher education 
and receive higher incomes than self-  employed workers. De Mel, McKen-
zie, and Woodruﬀ (chapter 2 in this volume) ﬁ  nd a similar relationship for 
microenterprises in Sri Lanka. Using Brazilian data, Djankov et al. (2009) 
show that family characteristics are important determinants of entrepre-
neurship. These ﬁ  ndings are consistent with the characteristics of new entre-
preneurs in Peru.
The novel contribution of this study is to use a reform of licensing proce-
dures in a single country in order to study the impact of entry regulation on 
entrepreneurial activity. The advantage of this approach is that it controls 
for time-  invariant variables such as the extent of market failures that may 
prompt licensing procedures in the ﬁ  rst place.
5.2    Background  and  Intervention
5.2.1    Project  Selection
In 2004, the Municipality of Lima (henceforth Municipality) and the 
World Bank Foreign Advisory Services (FIAS) jointly conducted a study 
on the main barriers to investment in Peru. The study identiﬁ  ed licensing 
procedures as the most important barrier to investment and new business 
activity. In particular, the study highlighted the municipal business- licensing 
process as burdensome. The study showed that about 65 percent of the total 
cost of licensing a new business was due to procedures administered by the 
Municipality.
As a result of this study, the Municipality and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), a part of the World Bank Group, decided to imple-
ment a pilot program to simplify municipal licensing procedures. The project 
team decided to implement the pilot project in one out of forty- ﬁ  ve districts 
in Lima, the capital of Peru. The reason they chose a single district was 162    Sendhil Mullainathan and Philipp Schnabl
because districts have autonomy in structuring the licensing process, and 
it was deemed too costly to reform the processes in all districts at the same 
time.
The project team chose the Central District of Lima for the project. This 
decision was based on three reasons. First, the Central District is economi-
cally the most important district with the largest number of businesses. Sec-
ond, the project team had estimated that a large number of businesses were 
operating without a municipal license in the Central District.1 Third, the 
Central District was broadly representative of other districts in terms of 
the cost of licensing a business and in terms of the length of the licensing 
process. The project team therefore expected the ﬁ  ndings to be relevant for 
other districts.
5.2.2    Licensing  Process
The licensing process in Peru can be separated into two parts. The ﬁ  rst 
part deals with the incorporation of a company and the issuance of a tax 
identiﬁ  cation number (RUC). This part is regulated and administered by the 
federal government. The second part deals with the issuance of an operat-
ing license, usually referred to as a municipal business license. This part is 
regulated by the Municipality and administered by the districts.
In this chapter, we focus our discussion on the second part of the licensing 
process: the municipal business license (henceforth municipal license). The 
reason is that the second part of the process was the target of the reform, 
whereas the ﬁ  rst part of the licensing process was not aﬀected by the reform. 
This is important, because some beneﬁ  ts of licensing are primarily associ-
ated with the ﬁ  rst part of the licensing process, while other beneﬁ  ts are asso-
ciated with the second part. Based on qualitative interviews, we learned that 
some businesses ﬁ  nish only the ﬁ  rst part of the licensing process, because 
they think that the second part does not oﬀer enough beneﬁ  ts to justify the 
costs. Usually, this means that these businesses receive a tax identiﬁ  cation 
number from the federal government but fail to obtain a municipal license 
from the Municipality. In the results section, we discuss how these businesses 
may aﬀect the interpretation of our results.
For the remainder of the chapter, we deﬁ  ne ﬁ  rms that have not ﬁ  nished 
the entire licensing process as informal. This deﬁ  nition is chosen because 
our analysis focuses on ﬁ  rms that are applying for a municipal license, in-
dependent of whether they had previously completed the ﬁ  rst part of the 
licensing process.
1. Prior to the reform, the Central District business register contained 13,948 active munici-
pal licenses, whereas the Cadastral Register counted more than 50,000 locations that pursued 
economic activities in the Central District. The diﬀerence between the two registries suggested 
that at least three-  quarters of all businesses operated without a municipal license.Does Less Market Entry Regulation Generate More Entrepreneurs?    1 6 3
5.2.3      Municipal License Prior to the Reform
Prior to the reform, the municipal business- licensing process can be sepa-
rated into four main requirements.2 The ﬁ  rst requirement was that businesses 
had to submit a business license application. In order to submit an applica-
tion, the business owner had to purchase an application form, complete the 
form, and submit the form, together with a detailed plan and description of 
the business establishment. The plan and the description had to be certiﬁ  ed 
by a licensed architect. In the application, the business owner had to choose 
between applying for a permanent or for a provisional license. The main 
diﬀerence between the two licenses was that the provisional license only 
lasted for a year but required a lower initial payment.
The second requirement was that the business owner had to have his busi-
ness activity approved. In order to gain approval, the Municipality checked 
whether the business activity had been classiﬁ  ed according to its oﬃcial 
classiﬁ  cation system. Loosely speaking, classiﬁ  ed activities were traditional 
business activities (e.g., retailing), whereas unclassiﬁ  ed business activities 
were business activities that had emerged more recently (e.g., information 
technology services). If a business activity was classiﬁ  ed, the activity was 
automatically approved. If a business activity was not classiﬁ  ed, the business 
owner had to ﬁ  le a separate license (CCU) in order to gain approval. Impor-
tantly, earlier approvals of similar activities did not establish precedent, 
which meant that each business in an unclassiﬁ  ed business activity had to 
submit a new application.
The third requirement was that businesses had to undergo several inspec-
tions. All business owners were required to undergo one inspection by the 
Civil Safety Authority (Defensa Civil), one inspection by the Cadastral Reg-
istry, and one inspection by a certiﬁ  ed architect. If the business was located 
in Lima’s historical district or operated in a historical monument, the busi-
ness also had to undergo inspections by two other agencies. In practice, the 
most burdensome inspection was the one conducted by the Civil Safety 
Authority. Many business owners needed to undergo the inspections several 
times in order to comply with all requirements.
The fourth requirement was that business owners had to have their busi-
ness location approved in accordance with zoning laws. Some areas in Lima 
were open to all business activities, whereas other areas were reserved for 
speciﬁ  c types of business activities. The business owners had to ensure that 
the business activity was permitted in their area. If the business activity was 
not permitted, then they had to ﬁ  le an exemption. In this case, the business 
2. The licensing process prior to the reform was regulated in Ordenanza 282 (El Alcalde 
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had to undergo a similar process to the one required for approval of unclas-
siﬁ  ed business activities.
Additionally, there were special regulations for businesses pursuing high-
  risk activities (e.g., gas stations), businesses larger than 500 square meters, 
and businesses located in shopping malls. Most importantly, businesses 
located in shopping malls could only apply for a license if the shopping 
mall fulﬁ  lled additional safety requirements set out by the National Institute 
of Civil Safety (INDECI).
5.2.4      Assessment of the Licensing Process
In practice, the municipal licensing process represented a challenging hur-
dle for many businesses. One measure of the diﬃculty to obtain a license 
was the dropout rate during the process. We measure dropout as the share 
of businesses that were successfully licensed out of all businesses that had 
purchased a business application form. We use this measure because pur-
chasing an application form was a good indicator of a business’s intention 
to obtain a license.
Figure 5.1 reports the number of business application forms sold and the 
number of successful applications for the years 2002 to 2005. On average, 
only about 30 percent of businesses that purchased an application form 
eventually ﬁ  nished the application process. This low success rate shows that 
many businesses wanted to obtain a municipal license but did not manage 
to complete the process. In fact, this measure of success is an upper bound, 
because some businesses dropped out before purchasing an application form 
or never applied once they learned about the details of the licensing proce-
dures.
In order to understand the obstacles to obtaining a municipal license, 
the Municipality and the International Finance Corporate commissioned a 
study to analyze the licensing process. The study identiﬁ  ed several problems 
that caused the large dropout rate.3 First, the Municipality had outdated and 
bureaucratic internal processes for dealing with business owners. For ex-
ample, only the manager of the licensing department was authorized to sign 
licenses, which meant that if the manager was out of the oﬃce, no licenses 
were issued. More generally, there was no sequencing of procedures, and 
the various internal oﬃces were uncoordinated. As a result, some business 
owners were sent back and forth between oﬃces without any direct com-
munication between the oﬃces.
Second, the business activities classiﬁ  cation was outdated, and it was too 
diﬃcult to register a new business activity. As a result, many businesses 
in unclassiﬁ  ed business activities decided to drop out during the applica-
tion process. For example, in 2004, only 1 percent of the applications ﬁ  led 
3. The discussion of the licensing process is based on Secretaría Técnica para la Simpliﬁ  -
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included an application for a new business activity. Several members of the 
licensing oﬃce suggested that this low number was due to the costly and 
time-  consuming process of approving a new business classiﬁ  cation.
Third, the inspections were often carried out with delays, and there were 
no clear rules on the requirements that a business had to satisfy. In par-
ticular, many businesses failed inspections carried out by the Civil Safety 
Authority. One reason for this diﬃculty was that the Municipality never 
issued guidelines on the requirements for inspections by the Civil Safety 
Authority. This made it impossible for business owners to properly prepare 
for the inspection.
Fourth, some of the zoning classiﬁ  cations were outdated. For example, in 
the mid-  1990s, the Municipality decided to establish a cultural area in the 
historic center of Lima. This area was restricted to bookstores, theaters, and 
entertainment businesses. However, there was little demand for such services 
in the historical center; instead, the area attracted many optometrists. Since 
zoning rules did not allow optometrists in these locations, many businesses 
applied for an exemption. This process took signiﬁ  cantly longer than the reg-
ular process, and only a few optometrists eventually ﬁ  nished the process.
Fifth, some of the additional requirements were diﬃcult to satisfy. In 
particular, the requirement for businesses located in shopping malls turned 
out to be a barrier for obtaining a license. The reason was that prior to the 
reform, only two out of about 150 shopping malls were properly licensed 
so that businesses within those shopping malls could apply for their own 
licenses. Some businesses in unlicensed shopping centers still managed to 
get a license, but it required more eﬀort, and many of the these applications 
were denied.
Fig. 5.1    Dropout rate prior to the reform
Note: This ﬁ  gure reports the total number of application forms (CAE) sold, the number of 
applications ﬁ  led, and the number of successful applications. The dropout rate is computed as 
the share of business applications that did not result in a successful application. The ﬁ  gure 
shows that about two out of three businesses dropped out of the application process prior to 
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Finally, many businesses complained about the erratic enforcement of 
licenses. Sometimes, the Municipality would send out inspectors to close 
down businesses that did not have a license. In practice, inspectors rarely 
ordered the closure of businesses; instead, businesses had to pay a ﬁ  ne for 
failing to have a municipal license, and some businesses reported paying a 
bribe. In qualitative interviews, many business owners reported that the main 
motivation to obtain a municipal business license was to avoid the hassle of 
paying such ﬁ  nes and bribes.
5.2.5      Reform of the Licensing Process
In 2004, the Municipality and the International Finance Corporate set 
up a joint project team to reform the licensing process in order to reduce the 
cost of obtaining a municipal license.4 The main elements of the reformed 
process were (a) an improved coordination within the Municipality, (b) a 
faster process for businesses deemed as low safety risks, (c) a single multi-
purpose inspection, and (d) an overhaul of outdated business classiﬁ  cations 
and zoning laws.5 We discuss each element in detail.
To improve coordination among internal oﬃces, the Municipality decided 
to assign a single contact person to each business owner. Under the new 
licensing process, the business owner only communicates directly with the 
assigned contact person, and the contact person is in charge of coordi-
nating all internal oﬃces. To facilitate this new structure, the project team 
reorganized the internal processes within Municipality to allow for better 
communication across oﬃces.6
To speed up the licensing process, the Municipality decided to link the 
licensing process more closely to the public safety risks posed by a new busi-
ness. The Municipality now classiﬁ  es businesses into low- risk and high- risk 
activities. The new classiﬁ  cation is based on the United Nations Standard 
Industrial Classiﬁ  cation in order to allow for regular updates following 
international standards. Based on historical data, about 78 percent of busi-
nesses are classiﬁ  ed as low risk, which means that the vast majority of new 
ﬁ  rms were expected to beneﬁ  t from the new risk-  based classiﬁ  cation.
With respect to inspections, the Municipality decided that businesses only 
need to undergo a single multipurpose inspection. This new inspection is car-
4. The reform of the licensing process is described in International Finance Corporation 
(2006).
5. The new licensing process is regulated in Ordenanza 857 (El Alcalde Metropolitano de 
Lima 2005).
6. One of the authors participated in a one-  day workshop to develop the reformed process. 
The most surprising experience was that many ideas discussed at the workshop seemed simple 
to implement and elicited broad support from all participants. For example, several people 
complained that oﬃce managers had no assigned deputies, which meant that some oﬃces 
would practically shut down if the oﬃce manager was absent. Apparently, many people had 
previously voiced this complaint, but before the reform process, it never resulted in changes in 
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ried out by the Civil Safety Authority and combines all previous inspections. 
Importantly, the Municipality decided to issue an oﬃcial list that speciﬁ  es all 
the requirements that a business owner has to satisfy. The list was intended 
to help business owners to prepare for the inspection. Moreover, for low- risk 
businesses, the Municipality changed the timing of the inspection.7 Prior 
to the reform, the Municipality only granted a license after a successful 
inspection. Since the reform, the Municipality now grants a license after the 
application is approved but before the inspection is carried out. This change 
in timing puts the burden on the Municipality to revoke a license rather than 
to grant a new license. Most importantly, if the Municipality fails to carry 
out an inspection, the business is automatically licensed.
The Municipality also updated the business classiﬁ  cation and zoning laws. 
The new business classiﬁ  cation system and some of the zoning rules8 are 
applicable in all districts in Lima. The Municipality also developed a new 
process to ensure that new business activities are classiﬁ  ed regularly as they 
emerge.
Finally, the project team developed a number of simple organizational 
changes to facilitate and speed up the licensing process. The most important 
ones were (a) the development of a central payment facility, (b) the integra-
tion of outside-  display applications with the business license, and (c) the 
creation of a customer care division. The Municipality also lowered the 
oﬃcial fees for applying for a license.
One important aspect of the reform was that it did not require any legal 
changes. After the reform, businesses still had to satisfy the same legal 
requirements as before the reform. Thus, the reform aﬀected only the admin-
istration of the licensing requirements by the Municipality without changing 
the legal requirements.
5.3      Evaluation Methodology and Results
5.3.1    Methodology
We evaluate the project using a before-  after analysis. The before-  after 
analysis compares outcomes before and after the reform and attributes 
changes to the reform. The analysis relies on the assumption that there 
are no other confounding factors that aﬀect the outcomes of interest, such 
as seasonal variation or other changes in the Municipality. We think this 
assumption is reasonable in the context of this analysis, because we observe 
7. Speciﬁ  cally, a business is low risk if (a) the area of the business is smaller than 100m2; 
(b) the business location has not been declared to be in a ruinous, uninhabitable, collapsed, or 
similar state; (c) the business is not operating in a declared historical monument; and (d) no 
dangerous, toxic, or highly ﬂ  ammable products are stored or sold.
8. In other districts, zoning-  rule changes took place along the principal roads, the so-  called 
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an immediate and strong impact directly after the reform. However, we dis-
cuss potential confounds in the result section and conduct some robustness 
checks to ensure the validity of our assumption. In particular, we conduct 
two rounds of interviews with newly registered ﬁ  rms before the reform in 
order to identify time trends in the main outcome variables. The analysis 
shows little evidence of trends.
We use two main data sources to evaluate the reform: administrative 
records and interviews with newly licensed businesses. We obtained the 
administrative records directly from the Municipality. With respect to the 
interviews, we conducted four rounds of interviews with newly registered 
businesses. Two of the rounds were conducted before the reform, and two 
rounds were conducted after the reform. One of the rounds after the reform 
cannot be compared directly to the other rounds, because only ﬁ  rms in low-
  risk activities were sampled. This sampling method was chosen to conduct 
a preliminary evaluation of the reform in the summer of 2006. We therefore 
report all results using data from the three interview rounds in which all 
ﬁ  rms were sampled. To check robustness, we replicate our results using all 
four interview rounds for ﬁ  rms in low-  risk activities and ﬁ  nd quantitatively 
and qualitatively similar results.
We also conducted qualitative interviews with a subsample of newly 
licensed businesses. In each interview round, we interviewed ten additional 
ﬁ  rms about their impression of the licensing procedures. We also interviewed 
several government oﬃcials working in the Municipality. These qualitative 
interviews help to develop a better understanding of the intervention and 
its impact on newly licensed businesses.
Finally, we only interviewed ﬁ  rms that were applying for a permanent 
license. Initially, we chose this restriction because our analysis of historical 
data showed that almost all licensees were permanent licensees. However, 
during the interim evaluation in the summer of 2006, we found that there was 
a signiﬁ  cant and unexpected increase in the number for provisional licenses. 
Hence, in the last interview round, we added twenty additional ﬁ  rms that 
had obtained provisional licenses. To ensure consistency across rounds, we 
use the interviews for the interpretation of our results but do not include the 
data on provisional licenses in the quantitative analysis.
5.3.2    Results
We ﬁ rst show the impact of the reform on the length and cost of the 
licensing process. We then discuss the impact on the total number of newly 
licensed ﬁ  rms. Finally, we discuss the characteristics of newly licensed ﬁ  rms 
and their motivation to seek a license before and after the reform.
Licensing Process
The reform of the licensing process led to a signiﬁ  cant decline in the cost 
and length of licensing a new business. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates 
are based on interviews with newly licensed ﬁ  rms.Does Less Market Entry Regulation Generate More Entrepreneurs?    1 6 9
With respect to the length of the process, ﬁ  gure 5.2 reports the total num-
ber of days from the start of application until the license is issued (time 
to license). The average time to license dropped from 110 days to 15 days, 
and the median time dropped from 40 days to 16 days. For comparison, 
ﬁ  gure 5.3 reports time to license based on administrative records. This ﬁ  g-
ure shows that the average time to license was 6.7 days after the reform. 
The estimate based on administrative records is lower than the one based 
on ﬁ  rm interviews, because the administrative records only include low- 
risk ﬁ  rms, which generally have a shorter time to license. Overall, both esti-
mates point towards a large and sustained reduction in the average time to 
license.
Regarding the cost of obtaining a license, ﬁ  gure 5.4 reports total payment 
Fig. 5.3    Average daily processing time
Note: The ﬁ  gure reports the average length of the licensing process for low-  risk businesses 
after the reform based on administrative records.
Fig. 5.2    Length of the registration process
Note: The ﬁ  gure reports the mean and median number of days required to obtain a license. 
The ﬁ  gure shows a large decrease in the length of the licensing process after the reform.170    Sendhil Mullainathan and Philipp Schnabl
incurred throughout the registration process. We break down payments into 
oﬃcial payments to the Municipality and other payments (e.g., external con-
sultants). The ﬁ  gure shows that the total cost of registration decreased by 42 
percent, from $212 to $124. The reduction in cost was primarily caused by 
a reduction in fees charged by the Municipality and a reduction in expenses 
for external consultants.
With respect to the time spent at the Municipality, ﬁ  gure 5.5 reports the 
number of visits to the Municipality. The ﬁ  gure shows that the median num-
ber of visits was reduced by 75 percent, from eight visits to two visits. This 
large reduction primarily represents a decrease in the time spent dealing with 
the Municipality during the licensing process.
Regarding inspections, ﬁ  gure 5.6 reports the total number of inspections. 
The ﬁ  gure shows that the number of inspections decreased from four inspec-
tions to two inspections. Qualitative interviews with government oﬃcials 
Fig. 5.4    Cost of the licensing process
Note: The ﬁ  gure reports the average cost of licensing a new business. The ﬁ  gure shows a large 
decrease in the cost after the reform.
Fig. 5.5    Visits to the municipality
Note: This ﬁ  gure shows the average number of visits to the Municipality. The ﬁ  gure shows that 
the number of visits decreased after the reform.Does Less Market Entry Regulation Generate More Entrepreneurs?    1 7 1
suggest that the change in the timing of inspections reduced the power of 
inspectors to slow down the licensing process. As a result, inspectors are less 
likely to let a business fail an inspection. Moreover, the new multipurpose 
inspection helped to reduce the number of redundant inspections.
Overall, the interviews with newly licensed ﬁ  rms show that the reform was 
a success. The reform led to a signiﬁ  cant reduction in the cost of obtaining 
a license and the length of the licensing process.
Number of Newly Licensed Firms
The reform had a large impact on the total number of newly licensed ﬁ  rms. 
Figure 5.7 shows that the number of newly registered ﬁ  rms increased four-
fold, from 1,758 businesses in the year prior to the reform to 8,517 businesses 
in the year after the reform. This increase represents a 43 percent increase in 
the stock of licensed businesses prior to the reform. To understand the large 
impact of the reform, we highlight two important aspects of the reform.
First, a signiﬁ  cant share of the increase was due to businesses that were 
already operating in the informal sector prior to the reform and decided to 
obtain a municipal license after the reform. We estimate the share using two 
diﬀerent methods.
The ﬁ  rst method relies on comparing the number of ﬁ  rms licensed in the 
ﬁ  rst year after the reform and the number of ﬁ  rms licensed in the second year 
after the reform. Based on preliminary data, we estimate that the number of 
newly licensed ﬁ  rms dropped from 8,517 in the ﬁ  rst year after the reform to 
3,500 in the second year after the reform. Assuming that all informal ﬁ  rms 
that wanted to obtain a license had applied for a license in the ﬁ  rst year 
after the reform, we estimate that about 74 percent of the increase is due to 
informal ﬁ  rms.
The second method is based on ﬁ  rm interviews. In the interviews, we ﬁ  nd 
Fig. 5.6    Number of inspections
Note: This ﬁ  gure shows the average number of inspections. The ﬁ  gure shows that the total 
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that before the reform, about 78 percent of all businesses operated infor-
mally prior to applying for a license. Assuming that this fraction remains 
constant over time, we estimate that about 78 percent of the increase is due 
to informal ﬁ  rms. Given that the two methods arrive at similar numbers, 
we estimate that about 75 percent of the increase is due to informal ﬁ  rms 
switching from the informal sector to the formal sector, and 25 percent is 
due to newly created businesses.9
Second, there was a large and unexpected increase in the number of pro-
visional licenses.10 As shown in ﬁ  gure 5.8, the share of provisional licenses 
was less than 5 percent prior to the reform and increased to 63 percent after 
the reform. This ﬁ  nding was particularly surprising, because the qualitative 
interviews prior to the reform suggested that there was little interest in pro-
visional licenses. Interviews with oﬃcials at the Municipality suggest that 
the reform made provisional licenses more accessible. In fact, the Munici-
pality did not provide the option to apply for provisional licenses prior to 
the reform and only issued provisional licenses when there were concerns 
about speciﬁ  c aspects of an application. After the reform, the Municipal-
ity provided the explicit option of applying for a provisional license. The 
advantage of a provisional license is that the Municipality only charges $50, 
whereas the Municipality charges $150 for a permanent license. Moreover, 
Fig. 5.7    Newly licensed businesses
Note: This ﬁ  gure shows the total number of newly licensed businesses in the years from 2002 
to 2006. The ﬁ  gure shows the number of ﬁ  rms increased about fourfold after the reform of the 
licensing process.
9. Importantly, both newly created businesses and informal businesses switching from the 
informal to the formal sector are important drivers of business activity. New businesses enter-
ing the marketplace are clearly an important force for investment and innovation. However, 
informal businesses switching to the formal sector can also be an important source of new 
business activity. For example, formal businesses may grow more because they do not have to 
stay small in order to avoid attention by authorities.
10. In 2003, the government introduced provisional licenses regulated in Ley no. 28015 
(Congresso de la Republica 2003). This law was intended to promote the formalization of 
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the Municipality set up new guidelines to issue provisional licenses within 
seven days. The disadvantage of provisional licenses is that businesses have 
to reapply for renewal after one year, whereas permanent licenses are valid 
until further notice.
Apparently, a large number of businesses preferred provisional licenses 
to permanent licenses. Qualitative interviews with ﬁ  rms suggest that many 
businesses heavily discount the expected cost of renewal. One reason for the 
high discount is that many business owners think there is a high probability 
that the business will not survive for more than one year.
Overall, we ﬁ  nd a large increase in the number of licensed business. We 
estimate that about three-  quarters of the increase is due to informal ﬁ  rms 
switching to the formal sector, and one- quarter is due to newly created ﬁ  rms. 
We also ﬁ  nd a large increase in the share of provisional licenses, which indi-
cates a large discount rate among new businesses.
Impact of the Reform on Firm Characteristics
Somewhat surprisingly, the reform had little impact on the character-
istics of newly licensed ﬁ  rms. As shown in table 5.1, prior to the reform, 
the majority of business owners were male; they were on average forty-  one 
years old, and more than 90 percent of them had completed secondary 
schooling. The median business had weekly revenues of $230, employed two 
workers, and had been operating for about one year prior to applying for a 
license. More than 50 percent of ﬁ  rms were in the retail industry, and the vast 
Fig. 5.8    Annual licenses by type of license
Note: This ﬁ  gure shows the total number of newly licensed businesses by type of license. The 
ﬁ  gure shows a large increase in the share of provisional licenses after the reform.174    Sendhil Mullainathan and Philipp Schnabl
majority served the general public directly. After the reform, there was little 
change in either business owner characteristics or ﬁ  rm characteristics. The 
main diﬀerence is that ﬁ  rm owners are more likely to be male. However, this 
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁ  cant. To increase sample size, we cross-
  checked the gender results with administrative records and did not ﬁ  nd a 
statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect.
Overall, we ﬁ  nd little diﬀerences in observable characteristics of newly 
licensed ﬁ  rms. We ﬁ  nd this result to be interesting, because many newly 
licensed businesses after the reform had been operating informally prior to 
the reform. We interpret these ﬁ  ndings as evidence that informal and formal 
ﬁ  rms are quite similar, at least in terms of observable characteristics.
Motivation for Obtaining a Municipal License
The main reason to apply for a license is to simplify one’s dealings with 
the Municipality. Figure 5.9 shows that the main reason to obtain a license 
is “to avoid paying ﬁ  nes and bribes to the Municipality.” This result is true 
both before and after the reform. In qualitative interviews, a number of ﬁ  rms 
say that dealing with the Civil Safety Authority, which conducts business 
inspections, is their main problem in dealing with the Municipality.
Table 5.1  Owner and ﬁ  rm characteristics
Reform Before After
  Interview round   Round 1   Round 2   Round 3  
Owner characteristics
Male 0.48 0.46 0.68
(0.46) (0.50) (0.47)
Age 40.7 41.4 39.7
(13.2) (10.2) (14.2)
High school 0.90 0.90 0.96
(0.30) (0.30) (0.20)
University 0.30 0.22 0.30
(0.46) (0.42) (0.46)
Firm characteristics
Weekly revenues (median) 700 1,000 1,000
Weekly revenues (mean) 4,230 2,520 3,114
(10,477) (4,181) (7,354)
Workers (median) 2.0 2.0 2.5
Workers (mean) 3.2 3.1 2.7
(3.4) (2.4) (1.2)
Firm age (median) 2.0 2.0 2.5
Firm age (mean) 2.1 2.8 1.1
(2.9) (4.4) (1.7)
Located in shopping mall 0.42 0.40 0.28
      (0.50)   (0.50)   (0.45)  
Note: Characteristics of surveyed ﬁ  rms and their owners; sample size: ﬁ  fty businesses per in-
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Importantly, we ﬁ  nd a decrease in the number of ﬁ  rms that report pay-
ing a bribe after the reform. Figure 5.10 shows that the share of ﬁ  rms that 
report paying a bribe during the licensing process fell from 9 percent before 
the reform to 4 percent after the reform.11 We note that paying a bribe is a 
criminal oﬀense in Peru, and many business owners are reluctant to report 
bribes. We therefore interpret these numbers as a lower bound of the bribes 
actually paid. Consistent with this ﬁ  nding, several businesses said in qualita-
tive interviews that the municipal license would put them in a better bargain-
ing position with government oﬃcials.
Other reasons to formalize were far less important. In particular, only a 
few ﬁ  rms mentioned that the municipal license would help them to have bet-
ter access to credit or better enforcement of contracts and property rights. 
Qualitative interviews with businesses suggest that businesses do not need a 
municipal license for access to credit, because a tax identiﬁ  cation number is 
usually suﬃcient to apply for a loan. However, some businesses mentioned 
that a municipal license would help in terms of rates and credit limits with 
banks. Similarly with contract enforcement, many businesses said it would 
be suﬃcient to have the tax identiﬁ  cation number in order to enforce con-
tracts and deal with courts.
5.4    Interpretation
We think there are two broad interpretations of our ﬁ  ndings. First, the ﬁ  nd-
ings may reﬂ  ect an improvement in the technical eﬃciency of the licensing 
Fig. 5.9    Motivation for obtaining a license
Note: This ﬁ  gure shows the main motivations for ﬁ  rms to obtain a license. Both before and 
after the reform, the main reasons are to avoid paying ﬁ  nes and bribes.
11. However, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁ  cant.176    Sendhil Mullainathan and Philipp Schnabl
process. By technical eﬃciency, we think of the use of new capital (e.g., new 
software) that helps government oﬃcials do their work more eﬀectively. Sec-
ond, the ﬁ  ndings may reﬂ  ect an improvement in the organizational eﬃciency. 
By organizational eﬃciency, we mean the reorganization of tasks within the 
Municipality so that government oﬃcials have better incentives to improve 
their services.
Our analysis of the reform suggests that the reform primarily improved 
the organizational eﬃciency. Most of the changes did not require new capital 
outlays but involved the restructuring of existing processes. As discussed 
earlier, often it was well understood within the Municipality that speciﬁ  c 
changes would speed up the licensing processes, and the reform provided 
the opportunity to implement changes that were generally understood to 
be useful.
This interpretation raises the question of why the reform was not imple-
mented earlier. Our simple answer is that government oﬃcials lacked the 
incentives to improve the licensing process. The licensing process only aﬀects 
a relatively small part of the electorate, and aspiring entrepreneurs—as 
opposed to existing businesses—have no organized constituency. The ben-
eﬁ  ts of improvements to the licensing process are highly dispersed, and some 
potential entrepreneurs may not even be aware of them. Moreover, it seems 
that a few government oﬃcials beneﬁ  ted from the status quo. As discussed 
earlier, a number of businesses reported paying a bribe to the Municipality. 
Hence, the lack of incentives for improvement combined with the oppor-
tunity to extract bribes generated a powerful force against changes to the 
licensing process.
Based on our results, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between an explana-
tion that emphasizes the lack of incentives of government oﬃcials and an 
explanation that emphasizes the opportunities to extract rents. In fact, we 
believe those two explanations are complementary, because they tend to 
reinforce each other. A complacent bureaucracy provides opportunities for 
Fig. 5.10    Share of ﬁ  rms that pay a bribe
Note: This ﬁ  gure reports the share of ﬁ  rms that reported paying a bribe. The ﬁ  gure shows a 
decline in the share of ﬁ  rms that pay bribes after the reform.Does Less Market Entry Regulation Generate More Entrepreneurs?    1 7 7
bureaucrats to extract rents. Similarly, bureaucrats that extract rents have 
strong incentives to support a complacent bureaucracy. Hence, the lack of 
incentives for government oﬃcials goes hand in hand with rent extraction 
by government oﬃcials.
Finally, we think our results are inconsistent with an explanation that 
emphasizes public beneﬁ  ts of regulation. As discussed earlier, the reform 
did not change any legal licensing requirements but only aﬀected the admin-
istration of the legal requirements by the Municipality. This means that all 
government regulation aimed at targeting market failures was unchanged. 
Hence, it is unlikely that the reform of the licensing process aﬀected the 
extent to which regulation mitigates market failures.
5.5    Conclusion
This chapter analyzes a reform of the licensing process in one district in 
Lima, Peru. The reform reduced the cost and time of licensing a new busi-
ness. As a result of the reform, we ﬁ  nd a large increase in the number of 
newly registered businesses. Interviews with newly registered ﬁ  rms show that 
the main reason for registering a business is to avoid paying ﬁ  nes and bribes. 
We interpret these ﬁ  ndings as evidence of a bureaucracy that uses licensing 
procedures to extract rents from businesses.
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